Introduction
Local economic development, public works and poverty relief have been major issues on the urban policy agenda for some time. Typically, these issues are dealt with as discrete subjects in the academic literature and as separate policy process within government. The international material on local economic development tends to focus on ways of stimulating the formal rather than the informal economy. It has however included an emphasis on the growth potential economy, both social and environmental concerns are prominent in official policy commitments of the two major local public agencies responsible for managing the area -the City of Cape Town and the Table Mountain National Park. As in many cities in the global South, proponents of social justice typically view environmental issues with scepticism. This is the case in Cape Town where traditionally the middle class was the primary beneficiary of the extraordinary opportunities afforded by the urban proximity of the mountain, sea and flora of the Cape. In poor areas, located on the flat, windswept plain between mountain ranges, poor services like electricity connection, waste collection and the absence of street trees have compounded the inhospitable lived environment.
Understandably poor people in Cape Town have not always been deeply interested in the environment. They have had no reason to look to it as an area of social or economic opportunity, but this is changing, in part because of a recent focus on the environmental sector as an arena for expanded public works programmes.
Apartheid not only bequeathed a socially divided, but also an environmentally divided city to the democratically elected government of 1994. Over the last decade there has been innovate effort to integrate poverty reduction and environmental protection and enhancement under the guise of integrated development within the new mandate of local government (Sowman, 2002) . This paper briefly reviews the official commitment to reconstruction and integrated development by outlining the Cities' position on local economic development, environmental management and service provision. Against the clearly reformed policies, that make overt commitments to the role of the developmental state in poverty reduction and environmental enhancement, the next section of the paper looks at how these ideals are being implemented. Two case studies of environmentally based public works initiatives, one in the area of community based waste collection and the other in fire protection through vegetation This pattern of progressive rhetoric or policy is also evident in the economic and service areas. Taking a lead from the Constitution and from national water policy the City introduced free basic water and initiated an indigent policy to ensure that the needs of the poor for basic services were met (van Rynerveldt et al 2003) .
The City was also the first municipality in the country after democratic elections in has since then developed its policy on local area implementation of community based economic development (CCT, 2003) . It is in the economic policy documents that the City's position on poverty reduction is most clearly articulated, and this therefore provides the focus for our discussion.
Despite the substantial political and institutional turmoil in the City associated with the establishment of non racial local government structures following the end of apartheid and the change in the party political control of the City, there has been consistency within its economic polices on three things. First, the interconnected relationship between poverty reduction and growth and the imperative of fostering shared growth, second, the City has long endorsed a post income or multi-dimensional definition of poverty and third there has been a consistent focus on the importance of mainstreaming and institutionalising antipoverty actions. A brief overview of the major points made in the 1999 and in the 2003 Economic Development policies is useful at this juncture. In the 1999 Economic Development Framework (EDF) the City made a simultaneous commitment to poverty reduction and economic growth as two sides of the same coin, this was in clear contrast to the then ubiquitous GEAR policy of national government that implied growth followed by redistribution. Second, the EDF understood poverty as a multidimensional experience and noted the lack of jobs, the lack of service and environmental degradation as key aspects of poverty that could be addressed by a developmental state at the city scale (Figure 1 ). Third, in the last of a series of background papers commissioned for the preparation of the Economic Development Framework (CMC, 1998b) effective implementation of the framework was seen to involve integration of poverty reduction projects into the core activities of local government as well as the development of monitoring and evaluation capacity. The criteria of integration included budgets, integrated development plans (IDPs), project appraisal, databases, staff training, performance management systems and all institutional transformation projects of the local authorities. In other words the City saw itself as either the driver or the Translating an integrated definition of poverty into an operational framework for local government:
Poverty exists when an individual or household's access to income, jobs, and/or infrastructure is inadequate or is sufficiently unequal to prohibit full access to the opportunities of society. The condition of poverty is caused by a combination of social, economic, spatial, environmental and political factors. Five fields of action to reduce poverty
The five fields of action for poverty reduction include:
1. Social safety net -in this we include 'indirect' income, for example through subsidies and welfare to prevent absolute destitution 2. Infrastructure -both physical (housing, electricity, water and sewerage) and social infrastructure (like clinics, schools, training facilities, amongst other) 3. Space -this refers to locational issues relating to access to employment and other social opportunities. Space also refers to the poor's exposure to environmental degradation in terms of both 'green' and 'brown' environmental considerations 4. Employment -both formal and informal jobs 5. Livelihood strategies -these are the social and cultural responses through which the poor help themselves and support associational/network activities Within the Economic Development and Tourism Directorate the development of the LAED framework was a specific response to the needs of poor community and the de facto recognition of the developmental capacities of the state to direct resources. Curiously, public works, or even labour intensive strategies were not discussed, even though as we will see, the other directorates in the City and other agencies in Cape Town were adopting these approaches at this time. The Economic Development and Tourism Directorate was never intended to drive or implement all LED in the City, but rather to provide the political and strategic leadership on economic questions. The question is then how other parts of the Council adopted and applied the principles on which the EDF and LAED were founded so as to embedded the developmental actions of local government. It is to this issue that attention now shifts though examination of specific projects undertaken in the Cape Town area.
In addition to being job creation initiatives there is a strong environmental logic to both projects we have selected for review. This is significant in that both projects embrace the spirit of the EDF and LAED conception of poverty as being more than just a lack of income. This philosophical departure found so strongly in the 
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expanded public works strategy. Indeed, funding for one of the projects was at least in part from national coffers dedicated to Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP). The selected case studies also provide a lens on the second major issue identified as important by the EDF and LAED -that of institutional anchoring. In both the cases discussed below the City was not the instigator of the project, but has come to play a critical role associated with making innovative projects sustainable and applicable at scale across the city.
The first, the more successful of the two, is an ongoing community waste scheme that is driven by the City but outsourced to contractors. The second is a fire mitigation programme that, despite high success in many indicators, closed in 2005 following the inability of the City or the National Park to negotiate the complex institutional politics or to integrate the programme within a single host organisation. The function of the programme -that of fire break preparation and alien vegetation clearing on the urban edge is however a local government competency and is thus an area of work it would be reasonable to assume falls within the City's domain of control.
Case 1: Community Based Waste Management System
The Community Based Waste Management System consists of a community based refuse collection system and an area clearing system in informal settlements in Cape Town. It is one of a series of pilot projects based on the principles and practices of expanded public works. In other words, the project uses not just labour intensive methods, but is also a project aimed at skills development, social cohesion and job creation for vulnerable groups. This multidimension approach is typical of EPWP in South Africa and mirrors the underlying philosophy of the City of Cape Town's EDF and LAED. Developed by an NGO in the mid-1990s as a pilot, the programme has since been integrated into the City as it was not possible for an NGO to run a municipal service or a parallel service in the medium to long term. It is a flagship for municipal environmental public works programmes and a model for City driven local economic development (LED) programmes. It is difficult to determine the exact budget allocation for the programme as it is drawn from a range of budgets, however, estimates from officials put the programme budget at R40 million (McKinnon, 2005) Africa Beautiful' aimed to create littering and dumping awareness amongst communities in informal settlements. The more the organisation tried to establish this awareness, however, the more it realised that its attempts were futile due to the lack of waste collection services in informal settlements in general. Up until then, informal settlements were only served by the provision of skips and it was expected that community members would dump their waste in them. This was a highly ineffective system and resulted in severe littering in the informal areas.
The organisation recognised the need for a refuse collection system in informal settlements as an essential precondition for littering awareness.
While committed to equity in service delivery, the City of Cape Town had experienced a range of problems in delivering its door-to-door containerised The tenders are subject to strict procurement conditions, emphasising black economic empowerment, which ensures that mostly emerging businesses and entrepreneurs are targeted. Before the tenders are advertised, visits are made to the community to introduce the system to them and to inform what services will be provided and about the tender process. Entrepreneurs are encouraged to apply for the tender. The Department holds "tender clinics" with the applicants and takes them through the tender documentation page-by-page.
A tender committee decides on who wins the tender. The tenders are allocated according to suburbs within informal settlements. Conditions of the tenders include that the minimum wage has to be paid to the labourers and the newly established company has to contribute to the Unemployment Insurance Fund and buy protective clothing and other provisions to employees. Tenders are allocated for a period of three years. Once the contract expires, the previous company and new entrepreneurs are allowed to tender for the next three-year period. Once the tender has been allocated, the entrepreneur has one month to set up his/her business and register the company. The City of Cape Town provides a small team of consultants to empower the newly established company during the first year of its existence. The consultants assist the company with the registering process, assist it with its tax returns and advise on how to do the company's book-keeping.
The company also has to conduct a house-count of all the houses in the area that he/she has been assigned to service within the first month as the company is paid per shack serviced. House-counts are repeated every 6 months due to the expanding nature of informal settlements. Once the houses have been counted, the area is divided into zones of 400 shacks each. For each zone, the company contracts one labourer. For each 12 labourers contracted, one on-site supervisor is contracted.
The labourer is responsible for the servicing of the 400 shacks in his/her zone and an additional 100m around his/her zone. The labourer's responsibility is to communicate with the residents of that area to determine one day per week on which the refuse will be collected. He/she also hands out black refuse bags for free to each household when he/she collects the refuse from the houses. The labourer uses a wheely bin to collect the bags and takes them to a collection point where the waste is stored and where city refuse vehicles can reach to take them to the landfill sites. Currently, old shipping containers are used for the collection of the refuse, which are locked at night to prevent animals accessing the waste and for safety reasons.
The labourer services 80 houses a day, five days a week. This occupies him/her for a several of hours a day and usually he/she will have completed collecting the waste by noon. The rest of the day is spent litter picking and cleansing. As mentioned above, the labourer is responsible for 100m beyond his zone, for example on verges, alongside roads or on open pieces of land. The reason for this is that many residents still dump their waste on the periphery of residential areas.
Although the tender contract is for the period of three years, labourers are contracted only for a period of 12 months. This is at the request of the community to circulate the opportunity for earning to other people. While no records have been maintained anecdotal evidence suggests that the economic mobility of people who have worked on the programme is enhanced and many of them have been able to find additional employment at the end of the 12 month period. With a recent renewed tendering process, an upgraded monitoring and evaluation system has been incorporated into the programme. Monitoring will be conducted in the areas once a week. The Solid Waste Department has established visual standards of cleanliness that are linked with a penalty system and monitoring system. Set against the 1999 and 2003 policy visions for pro-poor economic development the Community Based Waste Management System has done well. Firstly, the programme has enabled the City to expand its service delivery and to provide an equitable service to people living in informal settlements. Secondly, the programme creates a responsibility amongst community members towards their own living environment through their involvement in the planning and delivery of the service. This has resulted in improved understanding of the trade-offs and costs of service delivery, increased payment of services and cleaner and more hygienic living conditions. Thirdly, the programme has enhanced the skills of labourers through the on-the-job-training provided. Skills development is one of the key principles of the EPWP approach. The hope is that through workers economic mobility, opportunities will be expanded through skills development.
Fourthly, the company benefits as it is exposed to the assistance of the abovementioned consultants who provide business support for a year, equipping them to develop as a SMME. Fifthly, as the programme is completely integrated into the City's service strategy it is both financially and politically sustainable. Finally, the programme is very cost-effective for the City. A dwelling can be serviced for R25/month, which is less than half of what refuse removal costs elsewhere in the City, though admittedly levels of waste production in low income households are well below the Cape Town average (Engeldow, 2005) .
Translating policy into practice is never simple and even in this apparently successful programme there have been challenges. Initially the programme created a range of expectations that were difficult to manage. Communities in surrounding areas began demanding similar programmes even where the City had full time employees in its service. Managing the political terrain of unions around the complex issue of community based outsourcing remains a major challenge.
Potential pitfalls are not only between organised labour and the community.
Given the high levels of unemployment there must be a clear strategy for distributing the opportunities. Limiting the duration of the contracts is one such strategy adopted in this scheme that seems to have worked reasonably well. This strategy has been driven by the communities involved thereby minimizing the inevitable conflicts over resources and opportunities. But it does not resolve the imperative of creating sustained job opportunities. Finally, the impact of the programme has not been adequately monitored from an LED perspective pointing to a need for great awareness amongst City staff of their LED role and how the City can use its resources to promote LED.
As reflected in the challenges earlier this programme is run by the City Waste Directorate. To date there has been no involvement of the Economic Development and Tourism Directorate outside of recognising the economic impact of the programme and flagging it as a case study in its LAED toolkit.
Case 2: 'Ukuvuka' Operation Fire Stop Campaign Case Study
The City of Cape Town is located within the fynbos biome, a fire dependant ecosystem. The relationship between fire and human settlement is never an easy one, as the frequent victims of shack fires in the city can attest. Over recent years the scale, severity and frequency of bush fires in Cape Town have increased due to the increased fire load (the bulk of plant material that can burn) associated with the presence of invasive plants. These big fires threaten plants and people. The Ukuvuka Campaign was set up after the devastating fires that raged over the Table Mountain chain First, let us consider the institutional question. Both WfW and Ukuvuka were multipurpose activities whose obvious institutional home was not immediately apparent, making the issue of interdepartmental, intergovernmental and public private sector co-operation key (Haricharan, 2004) . It was during the heart of the WfW's contested institutional location debate that the Ukuvuka Campaign came into being, so it was set up as an independent agency and a public private partnership. The intention was to enable the fulfillment of public sector mandates in respect of wildfire management, invasive alien vegetation control and poverty relief in the form of a public works programme. This search for institutional independence helps explain why Ukuvuka was not located in either the Table Mountain National Park or the City from its start. But as we shall see 'independence' came at the cost of institutional buy-in and long term sustainability.
Second, whereas there are effective and even cheaper biological and mechanical approaches to alien plant clearing, Ukuvuka -like WfW -adopted an extended public works strategy for the task of alien plant clearing. To reduce fire risk Ukuvuka therefore combined a technical initiative to combat invading alien plants and a developmental initiative that focused on the labour-intensive nature of the work and concomitant training and empowerment initiatives. Vulnerable groups were targeted for inclusion in a programme whose primary rationale was split between social and environmental objectives.
Third, the assumption made in the WfW programme was that public works employment, when coupled with training opportunities, would significantly enhance subsequent employment performance once a worker left the programme.
Yet, WfW suspended its exit programme aimed at getting participants jobs because evaluations showed that the training aspect of the programme had not enhanced the labour market performance of former workers.
The major constraint to improved labour market performance was not the WfW programme, but the fact that the available job opportunities were very limited.
McCord reflects that: "…while the Department of Public Works characterises post-Public Works Programme employment options as "graduating to employment under normal conditions", the evidence from surveys suggests that workers may rather graduate to unemployment under normal conditions, returning to the status quo
ante in terms of their labour market performance." (McCord, 2003) .
Seeking to learn from WfW's mistakes Ukavuka sought to avoid this problem by adopting a different approach to skills development that emphasized small business development as an integral part of the programme design. Unlike WfW that had taken a comprehensive approach to maximising water resources and so had cleared aliens on public and private land, Ukavuka recognised that all aliens presented a fire threat but sought to create a post public works niche for its programme participants by leaving some land uncleared. The Ukuvuka
Campaign therefore took a policy decision at an early stage to work on public land in Cape Town area and to test out the legislation forcing private owners to clear their land of alien plants -thereby addressing fire risk while stimulating a demand for clearing. The idea in the programme itself was both to consolidate small business entities capable of subcontracting on clearing public land for public entities (the City, the Park etc) and also to create a market for invasive alien clearing beyond the City, the Park and other public bodies on private land.
The Ukuvuka Campaign was initially conceptualized as a four year Public-Private partnership to ensure improved fire management within the area. The Campaign would be a Non Profit Organisation mandated to work with the key public entities including the Table Mountain 
Box 1: Achievements of Ukuvuka (Fowkes and Fowkes 2004)
• Approximately 5000 hectares of public land in the Cape Town area was cleared of invasive alien vegetation (including initial and follow up clearing operations),
• 230 kilometers of firebreaks were established.
• 25 contracting entities (334 persons) were sourced from surrounding impoverished communities resulting in 160400 person days of work.
• In 2004 alone there were 212 person days of training for the year.
The Ukuvuka Campaign also facilitated the agreements regarding fire management between two state agencies -the City and Table So, the Ukuvuka Campaign had some successes, but this cannot mask major internal problems that speak to the difficulty of seeking to address the multiple aspects of poverty through a single programme design. The ambitious goals of Ukukuka generated implementation tensions, especially around cost effectiveness.
In the Cape Town area Ukuvuka clearing cost R 7000 per hectare and an average person day cost R220, approximately two times more expensive than the WfW norms for similar clearing operations. Three contextual elements are key to understanding this lack of efficiency. Firstly, as mentioned above, the original teams put in place were based on the ideas of ensuring post programme jobs. This meant outsourcing to small teams or independent contractors who would clear -first for Ukuvuka on public land and later in the open market on private land. But running an alien clearing small business is a complex and difficult task, often underestimated by project managers and supervisors as it includes executing task based methods, small business management and administrative support. It is not the typical public works approach that focuses on temporary and unskilled work. While backup to support small business development and entrepreneurship was available as part of the extended public works approach adopted by Ukuvuka, the support and training were often haphazard and not of sufficient quality to guarantee the level of skills development needed for sustainability (Douglas, 2003) .
Secondly, while the Ukuvuka Campaign recruited the workers for the public works aspects of the programme and played a direct role in the development of the teams and team members, the Campaign staff had no implementation authority over the actual work performed. Instead, Ukuvuka subcontracted the key public partners in particular the Table Mountain National Park and City to contract and manage the operations. Clear institutional relationships, coherent planning, administrative synchronicity and shared vision with these frontline partners was essential to the efficacy of the Ukuvuka goal. Unfortunately, despite the policy commitments to poverty reduction, public works and environmental improvement cited above, problems in respect of these criteria dogged the programme throughout its tenure and impacted negatively on the number and consistency of jobs created as well as the quality of the development of the contracting entities (le Ross, 2004) . For example, the Table Mountain National Park, although a primary partner of the Campaign, employed all its own contractors (in and out the Ukuvuka Programme) using standard procurement procedures that did not allow for the developmental aspects of enabling emerging businesses. A lack of systematic planning, haphazard training opportunities and supervision and mentoring within the Park, the City and Ukuvuka resulted in a lack of a consistent work environment for the contracting teams and thus a poor productivity rate and high worker turnover. All of which undermined the struggling new businesses and in many cases saw contractors running at a loss despite the expensive support available.
Thirdly, the Campaign, while using the national EPWP Guide or national Code of Good Practice for Special Public Works Programmes , especially with regard to the recruitment of workers from impoverished areas and the emphasis on the gender balance, deviated from the EPWP policy in a number of respects. Wage levels were negotiated and therefore pitched at a far higher level than the normal public works rates and training opportunities were not formalised as per the code. This raised overall costs and ultimately undermined the project's viability.
Early signs of the problems that would ultimately sink the programme were noted.
In (Fowkes and Fowkes, 2004) . 
Conclusion
There is much to be gained by reflecting on the anti-poverty policies and EPWP practices in CapeTown at the most general level that it is easy in theory and much more difficult in practice to adopt a holistic approach. Institutional mechanisms are key to sustainability.
Environment offers significant scope as a sector for anti-poverty action in cities.
The new poverty agenda implies that 'good' poverty reduction programmes are not one dimensional, for example focussing simultaneously on income from short term work plus skills development and environmental enhancement or hazard reduction. In addition 'good' poverty reduction programmes are those that can be rolled out at a scale that will make a dent on the urban poverty problem and that can be sustained through time. Implied in this is that government will be able to embrace and drive such anti-poverty projects. On the former criteria of multidimensionality, in both cases the Cape Town projects achieved more than unskilled job days. In the case of the community waste programme the City's service has been extended, small contractors have emerged and neighbourhood cleanliness has been improved. In the case of Ukuvuka there were short term gains beyond job days including hazard mitigation and skills development.
However, failure to address the imperative of institutional grounding and sustainable budgeting meant project closure leaving uncertainty over what seemed to present an ideal opportunity for integrated social, economic and environmental gains. It was not just the potential beneficiaries who lost out.
Because alien control is a legislated requirement, the City, Park and other stakeholders will have to go back to the drawing board on the task of fire protection. In contrast, the lesson of institutional grounding was well taken in the case of the waste project where the project lives as an integral part of the City's service delivery strategy. The waste project provides jobs, makes a contribution to improving living conditions and public health. Of course there are other ways that these objectives could be achieved, but without much more detailed data comparative costing is hard to compile. What is clear in both the waste project and the fire reduction project is that a straight economic costing would be insufficient to measure poverty reduction benefits and full social, economic and environmental assessments of EPWP should be prepared. If projects are to be rolled out at scale then the monitoring and evaluation system needs to be part of a wider City scale assessment of the impact of its poverty reduction efforts, especially as projects may well be located in different Directorates.
Even Town LAED made clear that the goals of the City should include sustained growth and effective reduction in inequality. Specific poverty reduction action was a small part of this larger whole, and the plight of the poor cannot hinge on success in specialist interventions like the EPWP alone. Rather, wider economic development, redistribution and equitable development, along with targeted programmes provide a sustainable basis for pro-poor city development.
